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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
•

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

-vs-

:

RAY KITCHEN,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
14732

:

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Ray Kitchen appeals from a judgment and conviction
entered against him in a jury trial before the District Court
of the Fourth Judicial District/ in and for Utah County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Maurice Harding, presiding*
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant Ray Kitchen was convicted by a jury of
aiding and abetting Lynn Christiansen in filing a false or
fraudulent insurance claim in violation of Utah Code Ann,
§ 76-6-521 (Supp. 1976), a felony of the second degree.
He was duly sentenced to the Utah State Prison for one
to fifteen years and ordered to pay a fine of $500.00.
Execution of the prison term was suspended.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the verdict of
the jury in the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 14, 1974, Lynn Christiansen's home
was burglarized and some items were stolen from him
(Tr.40).

He proceeded to file a claim of loss with

his insurance company, National American Insurance
Company, for various items, some of which did not belong
to him or were not stolen from him (Tr.40-41).

These

items included a man's and a woman's ring (which
Christiansen did not own), a cassette stereo, a clock
radio and a small silver jewelry case.

Christiansen

testified that of the items that he thought were
stolen, none of them had been purchased at appellant's
shop, Lan's Watch Shop (Tr.41-44).

When the insurance

adjuster requested further documentation for some of
the items on the claim, Christiansen went to the
appellant to have him prepare receipts for the items
(Tr.42-43)*

Christiansen testified that he told

appellant of the burglary,that he intended to pad his
insurance claim (Tr.43), and that he needed Kitchen
to prepare receipts for a man's ring, a lady's ring,
a Sony clock radio and a Sony stereo (cassette) (Tr.44).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Appellant duly made out the receipts and gave them
to Christiansen (Tr.44-45) (State's Exhibits 4 and
5).

Christiansen then submitted the claim form and

receipts in excess of $lf400.00 (Record 22).
Subsequently, Christainsen received a draft for
$1,130.75 from the insurance company (Exhibit number
6), forged his wife's signature on the draft, and
deposited it in his account (Tr.46;59).
Apparently, at the request of Christiansen's
ex-wife, the Utah County Attorney's Office initiated an
investigation of the payment of the claim.

On July

18, 197 5, two investigators went to appellant's shop
and asked him if he had prepared the receipts to
substantiate Christiansen's claim (Tr.30).

Appellant

replied, that he had and further stated that he had
referred to some cards which he kept for all purchases.
Appellant told the investigators that he did not have
the cards at the store but he thought they were probably
at his home (Tr.31).

When the investigators returned,

appellant stated he was unable to find them (Tr.31).
The investigators left without the proof of purchase
they had requested.

-3-
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Lynn Christiansen was granted immunity to
testify at appellant's trial (Tr.39).

At trial,

appellant was convicted by a jury of aiding and
abetting the filing of the false or fraudulent
insurance claim.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUFFICIENT CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE OF THE
ACCOMPLICE'S TESTIMONY WAS INTRODUCED AT TRIAL TO
WARRANT CONVICTION OF THE APPELLANT.
At common law, accomplice testimony was
sometimes considered suspect because of the possibility
an accomplice desired to blame another for a crime,
and a warning instruction by the court was required,
admonishing the jury to view the testimony with this
in mind.

This is the practice of the federal judiciary

and the majority of the states today, 1962 Utah Law
Review 60.

In Utah, and in nearly half the states,

however, a conviction is not allowed based solely upon
the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.

Utah

Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953), as amended, provides:
"A conviction shall not be had
on the testimony of an accomplice
unless he is corroborated by other
evidence, which in itself and without
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the aid of the testimony of the
accomplice tends to connect the
defendant with the commission of
the offense; and the corroboration
shall not be sufficient,if it merely
shows the commission of the offense or
the circumstances thereof."
Question has naturally arisen as to what constitutes
f,

sufficient" corroboration.

In State v. Sinclair,

15 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 465 (1964), the Utah Supreme
Court stated that the proper test to determine the
sufficiency of the corroborative evidence is whether
there is:
". . . evidence, independent
of the testimony of the accomplice,
which the jury could reasonably
believe tends to implicate and
connect the defendant with the
commission of the crime." Id.,.
389 P.2d at 468.
See also State v. Baran, 25 Utah 2d 16, 474 P.2d 728
(1970); State v. Clark, 3 Utah 2d 382, 284 P.2d 700 (1955),
and cases there cited.

This Court elaborated on the

interpretation of the requisite criteria in State v.
Vigil, 132 Utah 495, 498, 260 P.2d 539, 541 (1953):
" . . . the corroboration need
not go to all the material facts as
testified by the accomplice, nor
need it be sufficient in itself to
support a conviction. . . it may be
slight and entitled to little
consideration. However, the
corroborating evidence must connect
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the defendant with the commission of
the offense; and be consistent with
his guilt and inconsistent with his
innocence . . . The corroborating
evidence must do more than cast a
grave suspicion on the defendant
and it must do all of these things
without the aid of the testimony of
the accomplice."
Respondent does not insist that the appellant
has misstated the law in his argument to the Court, but
does contend that the evidence at trial did satisfy
the standards set by the Court.

At trial, the accomplice,

Lynn Christiansen, testified that he falsified the claim
he submitted to his insurance company by adding fictitious
items to it (T.41).

He testified that none of the items

on the claim had been purchased from the appellant (T.41,
45-46).

He stated that when he received a follow-up

request for more documentation from the insurance
adjuster (Tr.42,44), he told the appellant of his plan
to "pad (his) insurance claim," and that he needed
receipts for the items he had claimed(Tr.43-44).
In corroboration of this testimony, the
insurance adjuster testified that he investigated Mr.
Christiansen's insurance claim (Tr.12), and that he
requested and received from Christiansen a second

-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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document containing further information about the
allegedly stolen items (Tr.14).

This second document

contained such information as the identity of the
property involved, the age of the property, and
from where it had been purchased (Tr.15).

The

adjuster testified that he received two receipts,
State's Exhibit

numbers 4 and 5, which were both

stamped "Lan's Watch Service" (Tr.17).

He stated

that the property listed on the two receipts and the
sales prices on them were consistent with the items
reported on the claim forms (Tr.17).

The adjuster

testified that pursuant to the terms of Christiansen1s
insurance policy and the items claimed stolen together
with the receipts, the insurance company paid the claim
(Tr.19).
Connie Christiansen, Lynn Christiansen1s
ex-wife, testified that although she had purchased a
diamond ring for her then-husband, she did not purchase
it from the appellant (Tr.25).

She stated that to her

knowledge her husband did not own a Sony stereo cassette
during their marriage, that her husband did not own a
man's dinner ring, and that the only diamond ring she
owned during their marriage was her wedding ring (T.26).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Mrs. Christiansen further testified that her husband
never told her of any burglary and subsequent theft
of property (Tr.29).

r-; ;

Brent Bullock, investigator for the Utah
County Attorney's Office, testified that he
investigated the payment of Christiansen's insurance
claim (Tr.30).

He stated he visited the appellant and

showed him copies of the receipts stamped with Lan's
Watch Service (Tr.30-31).

He testified that the

appellant indicated that he had made out those receipts
(Tr.31).

Additionally, Bullock testified as to the

rest of their conversation that day:
"Q. Was there a further
conversation?
A. Yes, I asked him if he had
made these receipts out because of
information that was supplied to him
by Mr. Christensen or had he referred
to something that he would have kept as
far as records. He stated that he
had referred to some cards which he
kept with all of these purchases. I
asked him if he had those cards in his
possession. He stated that he did not
have them at his store at that time,
but he thought they were probably at
his place of residence. I asked Mr.
Kitchen if he would secure these
receipts for us and return the proceeding
Monday, which would have been July the
21st. We never went back until the 22nd,
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which was a Tuesday. I asked Mr.
Kitchen if in fact he had those
receipts or had those cards that
he had referred to, and he stated
that he was unable to find them.
Q. I take it then you were
investigating Mr. Christensen,
is that correct?
A. Yes, that is correct.
Q. Did you have any other
conversations with Mr. Kitchen?
Was there any other conversation
on the two occasions to which you
have testified?
A. Yes, I asked him if his
records would reflect for the
approximate dates of these receipts
this amount of money that had been
transacted and he stated it probably
would and he referred us to his CPA
firm, and we indicated that we would
go talk to them, and then he stated
to us it may possibly not reflect that,
because it was a cash transaction.
I then asked him if he had any receipts
or warranty cards that he might keep with
the Sony equipment and he stated that it
was the responsibility of the person who
was buying that to send that into the
factory.
Q. Did he state to you anyone else
had prepared those documents?
A. No, he did not.
He stated that he had prepared
them." (Tr.31-32).
Wayne Watson also investigated the claim for the
Utah County Attorney's Office (Tr.35).

Much of his testimony

corroborated Mr. Bullock's testimony, adding that when he
and Bullock returned to the appellant's shop to pick up
the original receipts, the appellant did not say that
he had tried to find them but needed more time to locate
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

them (Tr.37).

The appellant himself added corroborative
evidence by admitting that he prepared the State's
Exhibit numbers 4 and 5 which were the two receipts
submitted to the insurance adjuster (Tr.78).

He

testified that Christiansen had told him he had been
burglarized (Tr.79).
At that time, the appellant indicated he
would prepare the receipts for him (Tr.79).

Appellant

testified that he did prepare the receipts, Exhibits
4 and 5, and gave them an itemization of the items (Tr.
86).

He further testified that he represented the value

of the items for the receipts only from memory, even
though they were allegedly purchased with cash (Tr.87).
He testified that he represented the dates the items
were purchased only from memory (Tr.88-89), and that
he did not inform the insurance company that the
receipts he made out were not the actual receipts
for those days (Tr.89).

Appellant admitted that the

amounts for the rings on the receipts were higher than
the amounts listed on his cards (Tr.93).
In his instructions to the jury, the trial
court stated the essential elements of the crime
charged that the State was required to prove:

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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l.

That one Lynn Christensen had an insurance

contract with the National American Insurance Company
which provided insurance to him against property loss
by theft.
2.

That on or about August 12, 1974, he claimed

that certain of his property had been stolen and filed a
claim for the loss in the sum of $1,130.75 with his
insurance carrier, which claim was false and fraudulent.
3.

That to substantiate such loss, he obtained

on or about August 12, 1974, at Utah County, Utah purchase
receipts for certain items of the claim from the defendant.
4.

That the receipts supplied by defendant

were for a sum in excess of $1,000.00, and were fictitious,
and the defendant knew they were fictitious.
5.

That the defendant knew such receipts were

to be filed as a part of Lynn Christensenys claim with
his insurance carrier.
If you believe that the evidence establishes each
and all of the essential elements of the offense charged
beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty to convict the
defendant; but if the evidence has failed to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt any one or more of such elements, then
you should find the defendant not guilty."
Instruction No. 3 (Record-33,34).

(Emphasis added.)
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Respondent submits that the corroborative
evidence meets the standards previously established by
this Court in that it connects the appellant with the
commission of the fraud by his preparing the receipts
at Christiansen's request.

Further, by his own

admission, appellant stated that the sales prices
listed on the receipts were higher than those on his
"cards."

Again, by his own admission, appellant stated

that the receipts were to be filed as a part of
Christiansen's claim.

This evidence, which is independent

of Christiansen's testimony, clearly connects the
appellant with the fraud and satisfies the sufficiency
requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-18 (1953), as
amended.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE INTRODUCED AT TRIAL SUPPORTS
THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION IN BOTH THE FOLLOWING WAYS:
(A)

THE CLAIM FILED WAS "FALSE OR FRAUDULENT" AS PER

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-521 (SUPP. 1975); AND (B) THE
VALUE OF THE FRAUDULENT CLAIM EXCEEDED $1,000.00.
A.

Appellant was convicted of aiding and

abetting Lynn Christiansen to present or cause to be
presented proof in support of a false or fraudulent

-12Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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claim upon a contract of insurance for the payment of
a loss in the amount of $1,130.7 5 with intent to allow
it to be presented in support of said claim (Record-63).
Appellant relies on Burke v. Knox, 59 Utah
596, 206 Pac. 711 (1922), to support his contention
that this Court should hold that Christiansen's claim
Was not fraudulent but merely excessive.

In the Burke

case, the plaintiff, a county commissioner, sought to
prohibit the defendants (judges) from proceeding in an
action brought against the plaintiff by the county
attorney.

The Utah Supreme Court decided the question

whether plaintiff's writ of prohibition should be granted
or whether the defendants should be allowed to try and
remove the plaintiff from his office of county
commissioner.

One of the charges against the plaintiff

was that he had presented a claim purportedly to
reimburse him for travelling expenses in his capacity
as county commissioner.

The Court discussed the

problems with these types of claims, stating:
"Minds might honestly and
reasonably differ as to what would
be a just and proper charge per
mile for travel . . * Indeed, minds
might differ as to the actual
distance covered in passing from
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

one place to another . . . True,
it is alleged plaintiff presented
a 'false and fraudulent claim,1
but that statement imparts no
information but the bare conclusion
of the pleader predicated on no
specific facts." Id., 206 P.2d
at 714.
The Court was concerned with the fact that although
the claim which was the subject matter of the suit
should have been a matter of public record, the county
attorney did not use that public record to properly
prepare his complaint:
"In similar cases brought to
the attention of this court the
actual thing or acts complained of
as constituting the fraud upon the
county were fully set forth and pointed
out in the accusation. Until that is
done in this case the accusation must
be held insufficient for want of facts,
the plaintiff be not required to
answer, nor the trial court permitted
to proceed." Id. at 715.
A lack of proper pleading in this case is
certainly not the question before the Court.

However,

even if the facts in the instant case squared with those
in Burke, the insurance claim submitted by Christiansen
would still be fraudulent, not excessive.

The claim in

Burke was merely an extension of a valid, similarly existing
claim for travel.

In the case at bar, Christiansen

submitted claims not only for items not stolen but for
items Digitized
he never
owned; and the appellant prepared receipts
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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for items he never sold.

This insurance claim complies

with the Burke definition of a false or fraudulent
claim in that the essential facts were pleaded, the
claim was for items which did not exist at all, and
the claim was made with intent to commit a felony.
Id, at 714.
As to the other two cases cited in appellant's
brieff respondent submits that they do not stand for the
proposition asserted by appellant.

Therefore, the

insurance claim should be regarded as false or fraudulent
as per Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-521 (1953), as amended.
B,
$1,000.00.

The value of the fraudulent claim exceeded

Appellant was charged in the information with

aiding and abetting "Lynn Christiansen to present or cause
to be presented proof in support of a false or fraudulent
claim upon a contract of insurance for payment of a loss
in the amount of $1,130.75 with intent to allow it to be
presented in support of said claim" (Record-63).

The

$1,130.75 figure represents the amount of the draft paid
to Christiansen.

In Instruction No.

3 (Record-33), the

trial court required the jury to find "that the receipts
supplied by defendant were for a sum in excess of
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$1,000.00, • . . ." (Emphasis added.)

Appellant did

not take exception to Instruction No. 3 nor any other
(Tr.lQ7).

The receipts, State's Exhibit numbers 4 and

5, showed a total value of $1,400.00 (Record-22).
These receipts corresponded with value given by
Christiansen in his claim.

The trial court did

not distinguish any portion of the claim or receipts
as fraudulent in its instructions, and clearly the
jury could find that more than $1,000.00 of the claim
and receipts was fictitious:

Christiansen and appellant

valued the man's ring at $325.00; they valued the woman's
ring at $350.00; they valued the cassette stereo at
$389.00, yet Christiansen admitted he thought the value
really only $120.00 (Tr.60); and they valued the Sony
clock radio, although it is unclear from the record at
what figure they valued it.
It is clear that even if the jury considered
only part of the claim as fraudulent, they still could
arrive at a value of property exceeding $1,000.00.
Moreover, appellant's reliance on Burke v. Knox, supra,
for the proposition that only the false or fraudulent
portion of a claim, that is, the excessive portion, may
be prosecuted, is not well-founded for the reasons stated
(A) of Point II.

Further, it would create a bad policy
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what is a false or fraudulent claim is a question of fact
for the jury.

In this case, the jury found that

Christiansen filed a false or fraudulent claim in excess
of $1,000-00 and that Kitchen aided and abetted in his
doing so.

•'

The appellant therefore was properly convicted

of a second degree felony and his conviction should not be
disturbed.
CONCLUSION
The corrorobation of Christiansen's testimony
met the test for sufficiency as defined by this Court and
the jury reasonably found that the false or fraudulent
claim exceeded $1,000.00 necessary for conviction of
second degree felony.

Therefore, respondent requests

that appellant's conviction and sentence be affirmed and
this appeal dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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